Objective: The objective of this study was to examine whether patient selection or triage requires placing a relative value on human lives and whether the values placed on these lives are consistent with current ethical theories.
Introduction
Technological and medical progress has increased the demands for intensive care; admissions to intensive care units create significant costs and may need to be prioritized when multiple eligible patients are waiting for an available bed. For an individual patient, whether a specific treatment is of any benefit is an ethically charged question. When more than one patient is eligible for intervention and resources are scarce, these considerations become even more complex. [1] [2] [3] Many ethical theories have been used to analyze patient selection for scarce resources. The differing options for making decisions in such circumstances can be thought of as representing the two opposing views of best outcomes versus fair chances. 1, 4, 5 Utilitarians believe that patients with the best outcomes have priority whereas the egalitarians believe all patients have an equal claim to life and deserve a fair chance. 1, [6] [7] [8] Some authors have refined this to include an initial minimal medical inclusion criterion and allocate resources to the remaining patients. [9] [10] [11] How age is weighted in these considerations is also problematic because it may not only influence medical utility, but may also insidiously introduce social utility into the decisions. 2, 6, 12 Aims of the study We aimed to determine how groups of physicians and university students in bioethical disciplines determine the relative value of hypothetical patients of differing ages and whether those values accord with current theories of ethical decision making and resource allocation.
On the basis of previous research, we felt that premature infants are relatively undervalued compared to any objective assessment of their outcomes and would probably not be selected for intervention when compared with other patients with identical or worse outcomes.
Hypothesis
We hypothesized that patients with lower predicted survival would be valued less. We further hypothesized that patients at the extreme of life, in particular the extremely preterm infant, would be valued less than other patients with similar outcomes.
Methods
Between February 2005 and January 2006, we administered an anonymous questionnaire to physicians involved in resuscitation decisions and to university students in different disciplines during a group activity in which a maximum number of respondents could be reached. Eight scenarios of currently incompetent critically ill patients with potential neurological sequelae were presented. All arrived in the emergency department of a university health center, when a family member cannot be consulted. Physician respondents were associated with McGill University. Students in law, medicine and anthropology were first year students from McGill University. The bioethics students were postgraduates from University of Montreal. We have previously published a manuscript using data derived from answers to a different group of questions from this study (addressing the issue of best interests), which were designed around the same patient scenarios described below. 13 The first question was a request for consent; all questionnaires were completed individually and collected immediately. The first page comprised demographic information.
The patients in the eight scenarios were of different ages, their outcomes were explicitly described in the questionnaire, including the percentage survival and percentage frequency of impairments among survivors; gender or other social information such as marital status was not given. The patients were presented in the order from the youngest to the oldest.
Four of the patients had a 50% chance of survival and if they survived, 50% would be without impairment, 25% mildly or moderately impaired and 25% severely impaired: a 24-week gestation premature who was just delivered, a baby just born at term with a known malformation, a 2-month-old with meningitis and a 50-year-old after a car accident. Two other patients were already disabled: a 7-year-old with multiple disabilities (cerebral palsy, deafness, developmental delay, learning disability, hyperactivity) with a new head trauma and an 80-year-old with dementia and a new stroke. Both were noted to have a 50% predicted survival and, if they survived, a 50% chance of having further impairment. Two patients had a 5% predicted survival: a 14-year-old with acute myeloid leukemia (with central nervous system involvement) with a 20% risk of impairment and a 35-yearold with brain cancer with 100% risk of handicap with treatment.
Resuscitation
After each patient, the following question was asked: 'Would you intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission?' Respondents could respond on a Likert scale, with the following options: 'always', 'generally', 'exceptionally' or 'never'.
Patient ranking
Participants were asked in what order they would resuscitate the patients if all needed intervention at the same time (ranking 1 to 8, with 1 being the first to be resuscitated). To evaluate the rankings, we calculated the mean, the median and the sum of the rankings. The lower the sum, the earlier the patient would be resuscitated.
Ethical approaches to patient selection
The two polarized ethical positions are equal chances versus best outcomes. 1, 5, 6 A strict egalitarian approach would use random allocation to determine patient ranking. [14] [15] [16] Other authors have suggested initially determining minimal medical criteria for eligibility and then decide for the remaining patients.
9-11 For example, the criterion could be a predicted survival of >5 years, which would exclude the 14-, 35-and 80-year-old.
A utilitarian approach could be based on survival, or disability, or could combine both using Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). For each of these patients, we calculated QALYs in the manner described by Doyle et al.;
17 this information was not given to the respondents. An age-based ranking in favor of the young would rank younger candidates before older ones. 18, 19 We evaluated whether patient ranking would fit any of these patterns of patient selection.
This study was approved by the McGill University institutional review board.
Statistics
Proportions were compared using the w 2 with Yates correction. To limit the number of comparisons and protect against type 1 errors, we only examined comparisons between patients when the overall w 2 was significant at P<0.01. Similarly, when comparing responses between groups, the overall w 2 had to be significant at P<0.01 before individual groups were compared.
Results
In all, 615 individuals were in our target groups and 527 received the questionnaire with 524 respondents (Table 1 ) (response rate: 85% of the target groups, 99% of participants). All groups had similar response rates. Students had fewer children than physicians (P<0.0001). Of the 357 student respondents, 107 were in law, 88 in anthropology, 139 in medicine and 23 in bioethics. Of the 95 attending staff, 32 were in family medicine, 23 in obstetrics, 12 in neonatology and 28 in emergency medicine (adult and pediatric). There were 86 residents: 20 in obstetrics, 33 in pediatrics and 19 in family medicine.
Intubation and consultation to intensive care
The 2-month-old and the 7-year-old multiply disabled child had the largest proportion wanting to always resuscitate (74 and 77%; P<0.01 compared to others), followed by the two patients with a 5% survival, the 14-and the 35-year-old (64 and 68%; P<0.001 compared to others, Figure 1) . Conversely, the 80-year-old was the least likely to be always resuscitated (18%, P<0.001), followed by the premature infant (35%, P<0.001), followed by the term infant and the 50-year-old (53 and 58%; P<0.01 compared to others). Sex of the respondents or having children did not affect the answers.
When pooling the responses 'always' and 'generally', X96% of responses supported resuscitation for all patients except for the premature infant and the 80-year-old (79 and 70%; P<0.001). For all patients, less than 1% of respondents answered they would never resuscitate, except for the premature infant and the 80-year-old (8 and 7%; P<0.01).
Students' answers followed the same statistically significant pattern as those given by physicians.
Patient ranking
The median order of resuscitation for all respondents was first: 2-month-old with meningitis, second: 7-year-old impaired child, third: 14-year-old with leukemia, fourth: term infant with malformation, fifth: 50-year-old in car accident, sixth: 35-year-old with brain cancer, seventh: premature infant and last: 80-year-old with a new stroke ( Table 2 ). Physicians and students had very similar rankings (Table 2 ). All subgroups ranked the 2-monthand 7-year-old in first positions, the 14-year-old in third or fourth position and the premature infant in sixth or seventh position. The patient with the most rankings in either the seventh or the eighth position was the 80-year-old (503 responses; P<0.001), followed by the premature infant (242 responses; P<0.001) and then by the other two adults (Figure 2 ). All other children had less than 35 respondents, ranking them seventh or eighth; no respondents ranked the 2-month old either the seventh or the eighth (Figure 2 ).
Ethical approaches to patient selection Random allocation was not used to rank patients; if respondents followed this model for decision making, all patients should have had a mean ranking of 4.5 (see Table 2 ). The significant differences in ranks is statistical evidence that random allocation was not used, otherwise there would have been no significant difference between average patient ranks.
Patients with a probable p5-year predicted survival were rarely ranked in the last positions, except for the 80-year-old. Fifty-eight respondents (11%) ranked these patients (14-, 35-and 80-year-old) in the last three positions. In all, 2.5% of respondents ranked the two patients with a described 5% survival in the last two positions.
Disability by itself did not influence ranking: only three respondents (0.6%) ranked the two patients with pre-existing disabilities, and the 35-year-old with a 100% probability of disability in last three positions and 17% ranked the 35-and the 80-year-old in the last two positions.
Because the 24-week, term and 2-month infants have identical survival and outcomes, they have identical QALYs The relative value of patients' lives A Janvier et al percent of respondents placed the three patients with the highest QALYs in the first three positions. Seventeen percentage placed the two patients with the lowest QALYs in the last two positions. Significantly, more respondents ranked the 35-year-old before the newborn infants than the other way around, which is statistical evidence that the QALY model was not used for patient selection. There was preferential ranking in favor of the children, except for the newborns. For example, 75% ranked the 2-month-old before the 50-year-old (who had identical predicted outcomes) and 75% ranked the 14-year-old before the 50-year-old despite the older patient having much better outcomes. Newborns were exceptions to this rule, only 19% of respondents ranked all five children in the first five positions. Sixty-one percentage of respondents ranked the 35-year-old (with 5% survival and 100% disability) before the preterm who had much better outcomes.
The extremes of life had a strong effect on ranking: 263 respondents (50%) ranked the premature infant and the 80-year-old in the last two positions. The responses did not fit any described theory of patient allocation.
Discussion
This questionnaire study examined the relative value given to patients' lives when all needed immediate life-saving medical care. This is called triage by some authors and is different from resource allocation when all patients are stable. 9 We believe this is the first attempt to develop empirical data regarding physician and 'educated lay-persons' attitudes toward triage decisions. The respondents were informed that the hypothetical patients needed intervention and intensive care to stay alive. Patient selection is described as a two-stage process by several authors. [9] [10] [11] The first step determines which patient is suitable for the intervention. For example, a patient dying of metastatic cancer will probably not be eligible to receive a liver transplant. Our first question 'Would you intubate, resuscitate and consult intensive care for admission?' selected patients to be in the candidate pool. The second step involves comparing the patients. [9] [10] [11] 20 Our second question, asking how respondents would rank patients were they all to arrive at the same time, forced the respondents to directly compare patients. Because of our high response rate, we know that the results accurately reflect the opinions of our target population, but these cannot be directly extrapolated to other groups or cultures. Also, all questionnaire studies have their inherent limitations: we do not know if opinions would translate into actions were the respondents in the specific situation. This study does not explain why caregivers think this way and only allows us to develop hypotheses. Further research is needed to continue exploring these avenues.
The 80-year-old would be resuscitated by fewer respondents than all the other patients, presumably because of his age and dementia. At the other end of life, the preterm, despite having identical probabilities of various outcomes as the term infant, the 2-monthold with meningitis and the 50-year-old trauma victim would be resuscitated by fewer respondents. Children in general would be resuscitated more frequently and before the adults, except for the preterm. Survival and disability (or potential for) did not seem to influence the frequency with which patients would be resuscitated. For example, the multiply handicapped 7-year-old was the patient most respondents would resuscitate. It appears that patients at the extremes of life are not always in the candidate pool.
Survival appeared to have some influence on ranking, with the 14-year-old ranking after two other children. Disability, in contrast, did not seem to influence respondents, the 7-year-old being resuscitated in second position by all subgroups. It does not appear that respondents ranked patients in an egalitarian way, using random allocation. A utilitarian approach uses ability to benefit from an intervention as measured in quality and quantity of life gained to compare patients. However, rankings did not reflect the potential QALYs gained. Several human rights codes prohibit discrimination on the basis of age. 21 But age, as well as influencing medical utility, can also indirectly suggest a certain social value. 2, 6, 12 With the exception of the newborns, the respondents overall favored the young over the old. The relative value of patients' lives A Janvier et al
The relative value placed on the life of newborns, in particular the preterm, is less than that expected by any objective medical data and did not reflect any ethical theory that we analyzed. Interestingly, the few weeks difference between the preterm, the term and the 2-month-old made a big difference.
Several authors have suggested that newborns do not have the same status as older individuals, because they lack personhood. [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] If, as stated by some authors, the neonate becomes a person at 2 months, when communication starts, then patients with cognitive limitations also have limited personhood. [24] [25] [26] [27] The pattern of responses that we saw could be explained by a combination of an evaluation of reduced personhood for the term, preterm and elderly demented patients (progressively reducing in that order), and for the other patients, resuscitation ranking was determined exclusively by the patient age. Other reasons for the devaluation of the preterm infant could be a diminished sense of duty toward them or even the fact that abortions are performed at similar gestational ages, suggesting that life is perhaps still optional. Are they victims of the media, where the focus is on miracles and disasters? 28, 29 The disease process could also interfere; when seeing the word 'premature', perhaps the respondent did not read further and assumed a bad outcome. Medical knowledge, surprisingly, did not contribute as the physicians and the students had almost identical answers. Is the systematic devaluation of the newborn due to deeper rooted anthropological, cultural, social and evolutionary factors? Until recently, most parents had experienced the death of a newborn or an infant. Perhaps the necessary protective mechanisms to avoid continual grief over the loss of newborns and resume childbearing have caused us to devalue them. Waring 30 , a philosopher, remarks that the value of a person is given by how we react to their death: 'feelings of tragedy, evil, loss and sharp regret are supposedly more appropriate responses to the deaths of younger people. One might view the deaths of older people as tolerable. Indeed, it is not rare to hear that 'it is better this way, nature took its course' and that 'he lived long enough' for an older individual. Similar statements ('it is better this way, nature took its course', 'at least she did not suffer') are also said for premature babies; maybe the premature infant has not yet lived long enough. 31 Is it reasonable to fix an age limit for resuscitation purposes? Zweibel et al. 32 found in a national survey that most of their respondents would accept withholding of life-prolonging medical care from critically ill older patients, but few would use age alone as a criterion. Setting an upper age limit for resuscitation is not a new concept. 33, 34 Some authors justify this with the 'fair innings' argument: in order for all individuals to have a fair opportunity, everybody is entitled to live a proper life span. 18, 30, 35 The view that it is appropriate to include age in some decisions about resource allocation is clearly not unanimous, [36] [37] [38] and we could find no policy or professional association guidelines suggesting an age limit for resuscitation decisions, except for premature infants. [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] At 24-week gestation, many national associations deem prognosis to be so poor that life-saving interventions are considered optional. The survival rate and the probabilities of long-term disability of the 24-week patient in our survey were designed to conservatively reflect the actual chances of an infant delivered at 24 weeks gestation in a Canadian tertiary care center. [44] [45] [46] [47] [48] [49] [50] We can find no other population in the literature in which a 50% survival rate and 50% 'normal outcome' among survivors would be seen as too dismal to justify resuscitative efforts. Policy statements for preterm infants often state survival and handicap as justifications for optional intervention, [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] but other factors, those which influenced our respondents, whatever they may be, appear to be more important.
This research is the first of its kind. Patients such as the ones we describe would have all died 100 years ago, and decisions to rank them would have been irrelevant as it was 'nature' that decided the outcomes. Policies, administrators and physicians now decide if a patient lives or dies, and which patient to be admitted to the last intensive care bed. Physicians are often caught in the conflicting role of doing the best for an individual patient, while trying to use society's resources judiciously. 51, 52 When these two roles conflict, value judgments are required. The results of our study are consistent and tell the same story. Some lives will systematically be devalued when compared to others. It is important we are aware of these biases as they will likely influence our decisions.
